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Archive for February, 2000

American Grand Strategy

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This was a two-part series on the relationship of India and the United States, on the eve of the visit of U.S. President Bill Clinton to India in mid-March 2000.

The rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was the central geopolitical anatagonism of the half-century that followed the conclusion of World War II, fifty years which also parallel the experience of India’s Independence. And with the collapse of the Soviet and state socialist regimes in the early nineties, India and the world have entered a new geopolitical era, an age whose contours are only becoming clear now.

The Policy of Containment

The guiding strategy of American foreign policy-makers and defence experts throughout the Cold War had been the policy of “containment”, premised on a turn-of-the-century geopolitical theory which had in fact been essayed not in America, but in England, by the strategist Halford Mackinder. Adapted to the Cold War, Mackinder’s famous theory of heartland and rimland states was the essential ingredient in American geopolitical thinking.

Briefly, it narrates the geopolitical centrality of the tension between the heartland states — basically Russia and the landlocked countries of the Eurasian continent, then the Soviet Empire — and rimland regions, which controlled access to the seas, like China, Japan and Southeast Asia in the Pacific; Scandinavia and Western Europe in the North Atlantic; the countries of the Mediterranean Middle East and the Gulf. Mackinder claimed that the key to global domination lied in the marriage of the resources, territory and manpower of the heartland state to the naval and trade outlets of the rimland states. To the British Mackinder and his American followers, this alliance of heartland and rimland had to be prevented at all costs.

Assembling the Frontline

This theory was crystallised into the policy of containment by the American diplomat George Kennan, in the fifties, as the U.S. assumed its role of global hegemon in rivalry with the Soviet Union. To this end, the U.S. exercised its influence over the rimland or what it called “frontline” states bordering the Soviet Union by negotiation and offers of trade and military protection, as in Western and Northern Europe through NATO; in the states on the southern flank of the Soviet Empire — Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Sheikhdoms, Iran and Pakistan. In coastal East Asia, Japan and Taiwan were recruited in defence against the joint Soviet-Chinese threat, which was neautralised by the U.S.’s biggest diplomatic coup of the postwar era, the opening of independent relations with mainland China in 1972.This string of rimland alliances was accompanied by the subversion of recalcitrant regimes, as in Indonesia and in Latin America; or outright aggression against hostile countries in strategic areas, like in Vietnam and Korea.

Surrounded by oceans and forming a subcontinent of its own, India was a rimland state, and moreover one friendly to the central heartland power, the U.S.S.R — a dangerous prospect for American strategists. However, India’s Himalayan isolation from the Russian-Central Asian heartland made it less susceptible than China or Western Europe to the dreaded heartland-rimland alliance. Pakistan was within marching distance of Soviet Central Asia, and commanded access to the Indian Ocean — where, after the invasion of Afghanistan, Russian soldiers would often romantically yearn to wash their boots in warm water. Hence Pakistan’s central role as a bulwark of U.S. influence in South Asia since its inception.

Defending Democracy?

This geopolitical strategy of containment was always rationalised to the public in the U.S. and abroad through the moral rhetoric of anti-Communism, or the defence of national sovereignty, democracy and liberal freedoms. With the implosion of the Soviet-socialist bloc, this rhetoric has now been globalised — the language remains the same, but the strategy, and the reality of the world it confronts, is now perceptibly different.

India never much figured in America’s strategic calculations for the fifty years following the war. Thus the recent espousal of a new beginning between the “world’s largest democracy and the world’s most powerful democracy” shouldn’t mislead anyone. Democracy has never been the concern of strategists, who are only too happy to suppress and destroy popularly-elected governments when they step in the way of the balance of power and the maintenance of hegemony by the dominant state. Korea, Vietnam, and numerous regimes in Latin America and Africa bear witness to this.

It is grudgingly accepted in the corridors of power in Washington that, despite America’s designating itself as the “last superpower” in an unipolar world, the central reality of the new international order is multipolarity — that, much like in eighteenth-century continental Europe, responsibility for the management of security will fall on a concert of great powers.

Several years ago former U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had, in his book Diplomacy, identified these powers as China, Japan, the U.S., a Europe led by France and Germany, Russia, and perhaps India. Kissinger’s vacillation in identifying India as one of the new great powers was reflective of the ambiguity in the early nineties, something clearly reversed by the nuclear tests at Pokhran in May 1998. The nuclearisation of India and Pakistan vaulted the subcontinent into an unprecedented role in the global balance of power, demanding its engagement with the world on terms which are still being decided.
The international order that is emerging out of the strife and instability that has gripped much of the non-Atlantic world since the collapse of the socialist bloc in the early nineties is still an uncertain one. Some strategists have suggested that global security will now be the responsibility of a concert of great powers, whose regional dominance ensures them a role in security maintenance in their respective neighbourhoods, where before Cold War rivalry would have ensured superpower interventions.

Regional Spheres and Great Powers

Regional spheres of influence are at the moment being informally demarcated by the ad-hoc reactions of regional powers like NATO, Australia and Russia, to events in Kosovo, East Timor, the Caucuses and elsewhere. Indeed the biggest points of friction are with regard to those regions that, with the end of the Cold War, are slipping out of the worldwide grasp of one of the former superpowers, and into their regional orbits. Examples are Taiwan and Japan, which remain under American protection in a continuing standoff with their increasingly powerful regional antagonist, China; large swathes of Eastern and Southern Europe which through the expansion of NATO and the wars in the Balkans and Kosovo are coming under joint European and American control; or Pakistan, falling into the regional orbit of India while desperately trying to salvage its former prestige as a frontline state — a desperation which dangerously inches towards the nuclear option.

The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar system, from superpower to regional spheres of influence, has inevitably challenged the role of the U.S. as well, questioning its relevance to far-flung areas where it had lodged itself in old fight against world Communism. It is probably in response to this that, in the early nineties, the Clinton Administration has undertaken several prestigious efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as in Palestine and Northern Ireland, and since Kargil in the stand-off between India and Pakistan. By entrenching itself in these regions through the brokering and mediation of their regional disputes, the U.S. can continue to claim for itself a larger-than-life role in an international order that increasingly can dispense with it.

Geo-politics and Geo-economics

In the previous article I did not touch on the role of economics in grand strategy. The American strategist Edward Luttwak has lately gained some renown for advocating a shift in strategic thinking away from traditional geopolitical concerns of military supremacy and facts of territory, to a new order revolving around “geoeconomics.”

This shift in thinking is perhaps not so new. Markets in trade, finance and commerce have been one of the motive forces of international politics, especially from the time of the great Western colonial empires, though the postwar era has seen an increasingly direct connection between the flow of goods and capital and the maintenance of international security. Countries like Japan and South Korea, cohabiting under the American security umbrella, became increasingly bound to the global market which was nurtured by the U.S. during the Cold War. In India, the post-Independence policy of non-alignment was as much the result of Nehru’s reflections on international political economy as of the purely strategic concern of remaining autonomous of the superpower rivalry.

More recently, the political fallout of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997–8 — the collapse of Suharto’s rule in Indonesia and the political instability which gripped Malaysia and Thailand — brought home the intimacy of capital flows and global governance.

In fact the the growing popularity of the term “governance” is a result of the discourse of global capital and its supporting bodies, the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organisation. These agencies’ decisions on lending and borrowing, tariff regimes and aid packages, policies of structural adjustment to the demands of transnational corporations and global capital, control more and more directly the everday fate of millions of people throughout the world. Because of its previous insulation from these global currents, and its autarkic market, India largely remained unbowed by these geoeconomic forces until 1991, when the IMF and World Bank came to the rescue of the bankrupt exchequer in New Delhi.

Globalising India

With the onset of the “second generation” of reforms — the anticipated wave of privatisations of the massive national assets of the public sector, the further opening of markets to transnational companies, the freeing of controls on capital flows — India will become more vulnerable not just to the dictates of structural adjustment that have shackled Southeast Asia, but to the political and military options of those few powers who dominate the IMF-WB-WTO.

It is against this geoeconomic background that we must revise our more traditional focus on geopolitics, and this revision yields a less optimistic analysis of India’s place in the world. The fact of nuclearisation and the increased prestige it seems to carry with it, is largely negated by the new economic policies since 1991, and the happy surrender by the new Government of India’s markets to the forces of global capital.

The intervention of the U.S. in the resolution of the Kargil War in July 1998 sets a distressing precedent for India’s aspiration to regional and global hegemony. Kargil would have been much bloodier affair and less certain in its outcome had President Clinton not instructed Pakistan to withdraw its forces from Kashmir on the threat of cancellation of IMF-WB loans, which keep our neighbour’s economy afloat. What today is the plight of a discarded Cold War ally, hostage to the whims of the U.S., could in fact be the fate of a globalised India in the future.

Written by Shekhar

February 24th, 2000 at 12:00 pm

Posted in journalism

The Historical Past and Political Present

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Constructing contingent memories as authoritative, and transforming the many threads of the past into a coherent narrative, the discipline of history is one of the most important fields of modern social thought. As an endeavour of the present, with its ongoing debates and revisions, history is inevitably concerned with claims to present-day power and representation. The controversies which have recently dogged the Indian Council for Historical Research (ICHR) in the past several years are thus not simply an academic issue, but a fight for control of our collective memory and identity.

Let us not misunderstand this dispute, as many have, as one between the “Western” and “Indian” versions of history. Nor is it really a fight over saffron or secular historiography. While no one can deny that the intensified assault on administration, education and public life by the Hindu Right in the past few months is a terrifying phenomenon, this issue goes beyond simple ideological postures and academic methods.

Sarkari or Sarvajanik History?

Last week, two volumes of the ICHR-sponsored Towards Freedom series of books on the freedom struggle, edited by the noted social historians Sumit Sarkar and K N Panikkar, were withdrawn from publication by the Oxford University Press under official pressure from the nodal ministry for education, Human Resources Development (HRD).

The General Editor of the series, Sarvapelli Gopal — son of Dr S Radhakrishnan and a distinguished biographer and historian in his own right — clearly stated that this was “a violation of the terms under which the project was conceived and executed. It also amounts to an infringement of the academic rights and freedom of the authors who were invited by the ICHR to undertake this work…It is disturbing and unethical that a purely academic exercise should involve intervention by officials.”

While many of the historians and academics who led protests against the HRD and ICHR last week raised the cry of intellectual fascism and saffron authoritarianism, which are undoubtedly valid, there is a larger issue at stake. That is the tendency for more and more of our public institutions to be taken over by small coteries of extremists and sycophants, who are unaccountable to anyone, and into whose hands have fallen many of the most crucial aspects of our polity, public life and historical memory.

Rationality, Nationality, and Public Life

The ICHR was constituted by an Act of Parliament in 1972, with the objectives of giving a forum for historians to exchange views and promote and disseminate balanced and comprehensive historical research, “to give a national direction to an objective and rational presentation and interpretation of history.”

Arun Shourie, BJP MP, Union Minister, and otherwise known for his vitriolic and shoddy tracts attacking anyone opposed to Hindutva, has in a recent book alleged that the historians of ICHR often used the body for nepotistically advance their own academic profiles and publication agendas. Contrary to the lofty principles proclaimed in its charter, it was never a representative body nor was it run democratically, and the protests raised about saffronisation is nothing compared to the corrupt ways of the old Left intellectuals.

While Shourie’s is obviously a motivated attack, in 1998, when the BJP reconstituted the ICHR by appointing new members sympathetic to their communal version of history, a Marxist academic who lectured in Delhi for more than two decades commented to me despairingly that Shourie is in his own way correct. Since its inception, the historians of the ICHR were political sycophants of Indira Gandhi who used the slogan of socialism as an exoneration for crude personal patronage.

According to this lecturer, the real issue at stake is not just one of saffronisation, but of the how we can run our public institutions to avoid control by individuals and coteries who are unaccountable and undemocratic. The larger issue with the ICHR, as perhaps with much of our institutional structures, is of the authoritarian and manipulative habits that have been corroding our public life since Indira Gandhi’s attacks on democracy in the sixties and seventies.

A Battle for Ideology or for Institutions?

B R Grover, recently appointed ICHR Chairman by the BJP Government, has appeared as an advocate for the VHP, substantiating their claim to the site of the Babri Masjid and implicitly justifying the violence at Ayodhya in 1992. Like the previous regime, we can expect that the sycophants and coteries of the Sangh Parivar will use the ICHR for their own purposes of patronage and largesse, at the cost of further erosion of academic integrity, and the independence of our educational and research bodies.

Perhaps the biggest dilemma is one of formulating a public strategy to deal with this situation. Unfortunately, in opposing the new attempts at packing the ICHR, Left-liberal social scientists have raised a hue and cry over the meanings of rationality and nationality in history-writing, and by turning the issue into a battle for ideology. They seem to have avoided the longer-term issue of who controls our public institutions — the small bands of politicking saffronites or socialists, or the people at large.

Originally published in Satyam Online.

Written by Shekhar

February 24th, 2000 at 12:00 pm

Posted in journalism

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To Privatise or Saffronise?

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In the past several months since the NDA coalition has eased itself into the saddle of governance, our media has waxed eloquent about a newfound stability of the ruling alliance. The easy passage of the bundle of reform bills in the Winter Session of the Lok Sabha was advertised to the public and to the world as a prelude to a new round of liberalisation.

The showcase of the much-awaited “second generation” of economic reforms will be the upcoming Budget Session, to open at the end of February. Compared to the messy coalitions of years past, it seems now that the BJP confidently straddles the centre of the Indian political fulcrum.

However, amidst the booming bourses and the hype around the visit of US President Bill Clinton, we should not be misled. The events of the past several weeks, notably the protests over Deepa Mehta’s film Water, and the announcement of the privatisation of Modern Foods and Indian Airlines, all give clues to the real fragility within the ruling party. The connection between these two events is not just incidental — Arun Jaitley holds both the Information & Broadcasting portfolio as well as that of Disinvestment.

Sanskriti or Swadeshi?

Last week, on the banks of the Ganga, one never heard a whisper of that other inflammatory slogan of the Sangh, opposing foreign economic domination and calling for swadeshi. This would have been truly radical, and dangerous for the new regime. We can rest assured, through Vajpayee’s “liberal” stewardship, that the strident slogans of culture and Hinduism will increase, and the politics of class will be silenced as the next wave of reforms approaches.

Earlier this month, political pundits were surprised to see the Prime Minister hitting out at Pakistan on several counts — for trying to disrupt the economy by flooding the country with counterfeit currency, by claiming that India was ready to match any nuclear threat in kind, and demanding the return of Occupied Kashmir. To this was added Vajpayee’s blessing of the RSS as a cultural and not a political organisation, to which the Governments of HP, UP and Gujarat responded by lifting the ban of their employees participating in the RSS.

Vajpayee’s tilt to the Right had less to do with these issues, than with an internal tussle in the BJP ranks, between the hardline saffron faction controlled by L K Advani and Murli Manohar Joshi and the so-called moderates, represented by Jaswant Singh, Arun Jaitley and others. Central to the Prime Minister’s calculations now is keeping this unwieldy ship together, to navigate it through the unrest that will be generated by the next wave of reforms.

Sabre-rattling against Pakistan, and the free hand given to the extremist wing of the Sangh Parivar as seen last week in Banaras, has placated the hardline saffron faction. And most importantly, it has wedded them to the agenda of privatisation favoured by the so-called BJP liberals.

Privatisation and Saffronisation

The showpiece of the new economic policies will be the privatisation of the public sector, foreshadowed by the two test cases floated earlier this month by Jaitley, and the further retreat of the state from its basic responsibilities towards the poor — subsidies to basic commodities which are now being cancelled; the WTO-dictated removal of import duties on basic food products which will have disastrous consequences for farmers throughout the country; and the withdrawal of responsibility for primary services like health and education, which the BJP Vice President J. Krishnamurthy has claimed the state has no business in providing.

If, according to Arun Jaitley, the state has no business providing bread for the people, and Krishnamurthy claims that the state should free itself from ensuring their literacy and health, one might ask whose Government is this then?

On the eve of the new Budget, the RSS and VHP could have mobilised its ranks on these issues, which redound most centrally on the livelihood of the masses. Instead they chose a soft target like Deepa Mehta.

This has saved the BJP from a major schism on the eve of one of the most important Budgets to be tabled in several years, one that will crucially determine India’s terms of engagement with the global economy. But one wonders what makes a bigger difference to the beleagured people of Banaras. Is it the rise in the prices of basic commodities, the further erosion of social services, the attack on organised labour — all of which will be floated in the new Budget — or the cultural sensitivity of an English film that will probably never be screened outside of some major Western and Indian cities?

Originally published on Satyam Online.

Written by Shekhar

February 12th, 2000 at 12:00 pm

Posted in journalism

Watering Down Water

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Even those of us of liberal political convictions must sometimes admit it. Something quite interesting happened in that majestic city by the Ganga this week. In times when it seems that politics is less about principles and ideas than about populism and pay-offs, when someone, anyone, takes a principled stand, it is touching.

Thus when the Sangh Parivar decides to blow up a few bombs to cock a snook at the nuclear monopoly of the great powers, it warms what is left of our nationalist heart. When they take out their ire against the arrogant moral universalism of Christianity by smashing a few churchs and torching a few missionaries, there is some pride in that defiance. Of course, such cynical vandalism is not about defending national sovereignty or our cultural integrity, as we all know. It is more about upper-caste vote banks and simple hatemongering. But we should be  equally aware that neither the nuclear powers, nor the Christian missionaries, nor Deepa Mehta and her snobby liberalism are blameless.

The Controversy over Water

This week the Hindu Right singled out the latest target of the saffron crusade, in Deepa Mehta’s abortive attempt to begin shooting the third installment of her series of films on India, Water. Through constant intimidation, extortion, and attacks, they forced the UP Government to suspend the shooting of the filmon law-and-order grounds. Throughout the controversy, we were treated to Mehta’s anger about how many millions of dollars she was losing everyday, how much she respected the culture of Kashi, and the complaint that the script had been cleared at the highest levels in Delhi. Similarly, Shabana Azmi, playing her favourite role as lecturer to the untutored masses, took the State Government and the District Magistrate to task for violating cultural tolerance, government procedure, and liberal freedoms.

If Shabana was hysterical then Mehta was stupid. She should have known that with the Bihar Assembly elections around the corner, beginning her film shoot at this time was inadvisable. Varanasi nearly touches the UP-Bihar border and has a large seasonal migration of Bihari labourers. The caste and communal politics of Bihar strongly reverberate in East UP, and the political winds of UP also blow down the Ganga to Bihar. For Mehta to descend on the City of Light with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of equipment, crew, and all the glitter that is but the fantasy of the miserably poor people of East UP, was idiotic at this time. To do this in the name of Indian or Hindu culture was offensive.

Using India as a Backdrop

When her last film was premiered at the London Film Festival in late 1998, one of the production assistants for Earth–1947 had, with starry eyes, told me that these films were Deepa’s way of coming to terms with her ideas of India. I found this absurd, because Mehta’s films are hardly seen in India, and are more a chance for her to demonstrate her liberalism to Western audiences ignorant of India.
I saw Fire in the U.S. more than two years before it was released in India amidst much controversy. And while one must condemn the Shiv Sena’s smashing and burning of theatres, at the same time Fire dealt in cheap, essential stereotypes of machos, brahmacharis, or frustrated women turning to lesbianism within a joint family. Earth was little better in its narrative of Partition. Disgustingly elitist, it shows how decent and defenceless Parsis are encircled by the violent passions of the masses, and are left wondering at what has become of rationality. The protagonists spontaneously break out fighting while sharing a meal in a Lahore dhaba, because they know nothing more than temple bells and the azans of the local masjid.

India and Indian culture are as much a backdrop for Mehta’s condescending liberalism, as the Ganges and Kashi are used as a backdrop by the Hindu Right for their fascist political posturing. And if we are comparing their relative skills in appropriating cultures for their own purposes, then the Sangh Parivar won the day hands down.

Perhaps this is the wrong time to attack Mehta, given the dangerous inroads the khaki knicker-wallahs are making into the mainstream in the past few months. But she handed this highly-charged symbolic issue to them on a silver platter (or is it a brass thali?) She probably has as much to gain in terms of pre-release publicity for the film, as the bureaucrats and politicians of UP do in terms of threats and bribes, and the Hindu Right does in pre-electoral rabble-rousing.

Originally  published on Satyam Online.

Written by Shekhar

February 8th, 2000 at 12:00 am

Posted in journalism

The Arrest of Dara Singh

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This week has been an eventful one politically. The arrest of Dara Singh, implicated in the murder of the missionary Graham Staines and his two children, a Christian clergyman and a Muslim trader named Rehman, is of course a welcome, if somewhat belated development, since the attacks on Christians began to intensify more than a year ago. What is curious is not just how long it took to arrest Dara Singh — who, despite being available for newspaper interviews, was able to evade the authorities for a full year — but the timing of the arrest. Some cynics point to the upcoming Orissa assembly elections and the Congress’ impending doom in the state, in the wake of the super-cyclone. To the cynic, this is a perfectly acceptable reason for the speedy arrest of Singh after administrative inaction for more than a year. While this won’t go very far in convincing Orissa’s shattered voters of the promises of “good governance,” equally important was another event announced late this week.

The Timing of the Arrest

The dates for the visit of U.S. President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in mid-March were finalised only two days after the arrest. This was also coincident with Gladys Staines, the murdered missionary’s widow, emerging into the public eye to release a book in Bombay and speak to the press about her husband and sons’ murder by a functionary of the Sangh Parivar. In the politics of U.S. Presidential visits to foreign, especially Asian countries, this assumes significance. In 1998, Clinton was beleagured by pressure groups, many associated with the Christian Right in the U.S., to halt his diplomatic overtures towards China, whose Government takes an exceptionally strong line on the “anti-national” and subversive activities of missionaries and Christians. Short of cancelling his visit, many groups and Congressmen wanted him to meet with Christian dissidents in China. With Clinton’s visit to India imminent, the White House perhaps wants to avoid the similar embarrasment in India, and the BJP-led Government has obliged its new strategic partner, eager to do business with the U.S., without the meddling of lobbies which continue to hound China’s patrons abroad. If Gladys Staines were ever to meet Clinton, it would tarnish the much-touted cliché of India’s tolerant and secular culture.

Proving the Secular Credentials of the Government

The arrest of Dara Singh, then, is no demonstration of the secular resolve of the Central Government. Other recent developments bear out this conclusion. In U.P., the recent statements of Chief Minister Ram Prakash Gupta approving the construction of the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya, and the recent passage by the UP Assembly of the Regulation of Public Religious Buildings and Places Bill, which prohibits the building of any temple, mosque, church, or gurudwara, without the permission of the Government. Additionally, this legislation sanctions the demolition of these structures if they are built without first seeking the state’s permission. Passed in the wake of the IC814 hijacking and amidst the media-generated hysterics about ISI infiltration of the country, it will further enable the harrassment of minorities.

In Gujarat, similar trends are evident in the decision of the State Government to allow its employees to openly claim their affiliation to the RSS, and the equally shocking display of the Gujarat Chief Minister in khaki shorts, accompanied by Union Home Minister L K Advani, swearing allegiance to the Hindutva storm-troopers. We can thus safely assume that next Christmas, when Hindu extremist groups want to terrorise tribal Christians in the Dangs, they police need not even keep up the pretence of protecting all citizens regardless of their religion.

The writings of one of the Sangh Parivar’s senior ideologues should make the core of the Government’s beliefs clear. In his latest book, Harvesting Our Souls, Arun Shourie, a BJP Rajya Sabha MP and Minister at the Centre, comments approvingly on the policies of the Chinese Government towards its minority Christian community. These policies include a ban on all foreign missionaries, the requirement of registering with a State-run Church affiliated to the Communist Party, and the haunting of minority groups as presumably anti-national.

Recently in Orissa, according to reports by John Dayal, convenor of the United Christian Forum for Human Rights, the Centre has been continuously warning Christian organisations and groups in the tribal belts of Orissa to obey the Anti-Conversion Act, a legislation which violates the fundamental right to freedom of religion in article 25 of the Constitution. But considering that this week’s other story, in which the Government showed quiet contempt for the President’s warnings against tinkering with the founding document of our Republic, these new developments seem consistent with the real character of the BJP-led Government.

Written by Shekhar

February 4th, 2000 at 12:00 pm

Posted in journalism